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Abstract
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erature started to explore also nominal debt contracts. Focusing on mortgages, this paper
compares the two channels of transmission within a common framework. The sticky price
channel is dominant when shocks to the policy interest rate are temporary, the mortgage
channel is important when the shocks are persistent. The ﬁrst channel has signiﬁcant aggre-
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1 Introduction
Models of the real eﬀects of monetary policy typically rely on nominal rigidities in prod-
uct markets (sticky prices). The New-Keynesian literature—represented by, e.g., Woodford
(2003) and Gal´ı (2015)—has devoted signiﬁcant eﬀort into understanding the monetary
transmission mechanism operating through this type of frictions. The focus has been mainly
on aggregate eﬀects; i.e., on how changes in the nominal interest rate—a monetary policy
instrument—aﬀect aggregate output, consumption, and other key macro variables. Following
Doepke and Schneider (2006a), another strand of the literature on the real eﬀects of mon-
etary policy has emerged. This literature, for most part, maintains the assumption of ﬂexible
prices but pays attention to nominal rigidities in debt markets (Meh, Rios-Rull and Terajima,
2010; Sheedy, 2014; Doepke, Schneider and Selezneva, 2015; Garriga, Kydland and Sˇustek,
2016; Sterk and Tenreyro, 2016, among others).1 In particular, this line of research recog-
nizes that most debt contracts specify cash ﬂows between borrowers and lenders in nominal
terms. As a result, by ultimately aﬀecting inﬂation, monetary policy aﬀects the real value of
these payments and thus, under incomplete asset markets, disposable income of borrowers
and lenders. By the very nature of the problem, this research can address redistributive
consequences of monetary policy, in addition to aggregate eﬀects.2
The aim of this paper is to explore the interaction between the two rigidities and compare
their quantitative importance in transmitting nominal shocks into the real economy in light of
the empirical movements of the nominal interest rate set by monetary policy. For a number of
countries, ﬂuctuations in the nominal interest rate are fully characterized by two orthogonal
1This literature is distinct from the literature on the credit channel of monetary policy, represented by,
e.g., Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999).
2Another recent literature (e.g., Kaplan, Moll and Violante, 2016; Den Haan, Rendahl and Reigler, 2016)
explores the interaction between sticky prices and/or wages and household heterogeneity (see, e.g.,
Gornemann, Kuester and Nakajima, 2016, for a brief review). As such, these studies can also address redistri-
bution. They typically feature incomplete asset markets and rich household heterogeneity, often arising due to
endogenous labor market frictions, in addition to standard New-Keynesian assumptions. This literature, how-
ever, abstracts from long-term nominal debt. Auclert (2014) explores redistributive eﬀects of monetary policy
operating through a traditional real rate channel. Redistributive consequences of inﬂation working through
other channels than nominal debt markets have been addressed by Imrohorogˇ
¯
lu (1992), Erosa and Ventura
(2002), and Albanesi (2007). Redistributive eﬀects of money injections arise naturally in limited participation
models (e.g., Williamson, 2008) and search models of money (e.g., Rocheteau, Weill and Wong, 2015).
components, one fairly temporary, the other highly persistent. It is therefore plausible to
hypothesize that changes in the nominal interest rate, and thus inﬂation, interact with the
two frictions diﬀerently, depending on their persistence. Especially, if debt contacts are long-
term contracts. Focusing on mortgage debt, we therefore ask the following question: suppose
the only impulses for the movements of the nominal interest rate were nominal (monetary
policy) shocks, what would be the quantitative importance of each friction, sticky prices and
mortgage contracts, in transmitting these shocks into real variables? To this end we construct
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that contains both nominal rigidities.
Our focus on mortgages is motivated by the observation that for most households the
main asset is a house and the main liability is a mortgage (Campbell and Cocco, 2003).
Mortgages carry signiﬁcant ﬁnancial commitments. For example, in the United States over
the past forty years or so, mortgage payments were, on average, equivalent to 15 to 20%
of homeowners’ income, depending on the data used; similar magnitudes are observed also
for other countries. In addition, mortgage loans have a longer term than other types of
debt, with the typical term being 15-30 years. This feature, together with the fact that
their payments are set in nominal terms, makes mortgages especially exposed to inﬂation
risk, thus making them a source of potentially important redistributive eﬀects.3 An issue,
however, arising with mortgages is that their form diﬀers across countries. Most developed
economies have variants of adjustable rate mortgages (ARM), whereby the interest rate
the homeowner is charged adjusts more or less in line with short-term nominal interest
rates. In some countries, however, the typical mortgage is a ﬁxed rate mortgage (FRM),
with the interest rate ﬁxed for at least 10 years and often for the entire term of the loan
(Belgium, France, Germany, Denmark, and the United States). The two contracts thus have
very diﬀerent exposures to nominal interest rates and inﬂation. Scanlon and Whitehead
3Even though mortgages can be pre-paid or reﬁnanced, the extent to which this is possible varies across
countries. While in the United States homeowners enjoy a lot of ﬂexibility in this respect, in some other
developed economies legal constraints and monetary costs restrict the extent to which this can be done easily
(see, e.g., Scanlon and Whitehead, 2004; Green and Wachter, 2005; European Mortgage Federation, 2012).
For example, Villar Burke (2015) documents that in France and Germany the interest rate on outstanding
mortgage debt stayed essentially unchanged following the Euro Area policy rate cut to near zero in 2008/09,
suggesting little reﬁnancing activity, despite large drops in new mortgage rates and stable house prices.
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(2004), Green and Wachter (2005), European Mortgage Federation (2012), and Campbell
(2013) provide details of these institutional arrangements, but a theory of such cross-country
diﬀerences is yet to be developed. We therefore consider both mortgage types.
Our analysis is based on a variant of the model of Garriga et al. (2016), who use it to study
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in the housing market. The model consists
of two agent types, homeowners and mortgage investors. Homeowners invest in housing,
ﬁnancing their investment with mortgages, while mortgage investors provide mortgage loans
and directly invest in productive capital. Asset markets are incomplete in the sense that a full
set of state-contingent securities does not exist. Instead, the only other ﬁnancial instrument,
besides the mortgage, the two agent types can trade is a noncontingent one-period bond.4
Here we extend the model by introducing standard New-Keynesian features, and elastic labor
supply by both agent types, and use it as a laboratory for our question.
Monetary policy is modeled as an interest rate feedback rule with two shocks. The
persistence of the shocks is calibrated so that, in equilibrium, the model is consistent with
both, the standard New-Keynesian responses to monetary policy shocks and the observed
persistence of the FRM rate. This makes one shock fairly temporary and the other shock
highly persistent. The temporary shock generates the New-Keynesian responses, moving
nominal interest rates and inﬂation (as well as output) in opposite directions as much as
in VAR studies. In contrast, the persistent shock makes nominal interest rates positively
correlated with inﬂation through the Fisher eﬀect.5 As the ﬁrst shock aﬀects the long-
short spread, whereas the second shock aﬀects all interest rates more or less equally, we
use information from the nominal yield curve to gauge the relative seizes of the two shocks.
Speciﬁcally, we decompose post-war yield curve data for a sample of developed economies
into principal components. Like in the case of the United States (e.g., Piazzesi, 2006), we
4Garriga et al. (2016) show that the model has a number of desirable properties in terms of matching
business cycle moments, responses under FRM and ARM of housing investment to shocks studied in the
VAR literature, and marginal propensities to consume of homeowners documented in micro-level studies for
changes in income due to ARM resets.
5Recently, the Fisher eﬀect came to prominence, under the name ‘Neo-Fisherism’, in the context of the
low inﬂation period following the interest rate cuts by central banks around the world to close to zero
(Williamson, 2016).
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ﬁnd that for each country in the sample the ﬁrst principal component accounts for over
95% of the movements in nominal interest rates across maturities, including the short rate
eﬀectively controlled by monetary policy. This component closely resembles the persistent
shock in the model (in the yield curve terminology, it is referred to as the ‘level factor’). The
second principal component essentially accounts for the remaining movements in the data
and is much less persistent than the ﬁrst principal component (it is referred to as the ‘slope
factor’). We associate the second component with the movements in nominal interest rates
occurring in the model due to the temporary shock.6
The main takeaway from the paper is that, in light of the statistical properties of the
ﬂuctuations in the policy rate, the redistributive consequences of monetary policy operating
through debt markets are of similar magnitudes as the standard aggregate consequences
operating through sticky prices. In more detail, the ﬁndings can be summarized in three
points: (i) The sticky price channel mainly transmits the temporary shock, the mortgage
channel is important only for the transmission of the persistent shock. (ii) The ﬁrst channel
has signiﬁcant aggregate eﬀects but small redistributive eﬀects. The opposite is true for
the second channel. (iii) Once the sizes of the shocks are calibrated from the principal
components, the redistributive eﬀects are somewhat larger than the aggregate eﬀects, when
measured by the unconditional volatility of percentage deviations of aggregate and individual
consumption from steady state. The size of redistribution is similar under FRM and ARM,
albeit the timing and direction is diﬀerent, and consumption of homeowners is aﬀected
signiﬁcantly more than consumption of lenders.
Our main contribution is the quantitative comparison of the nominal debt (mortgage)
channel with the traditional sticky price channel in light of the empirical properties of nom-
inal interest rates. By abstracting from other frictions, the paper provides a clean account
of the relative importance of these two rigidities. While more narrow in the coverage of
6Of course, the second component in the data is aﬀected by other factors, such as time-varying risk
premia, than just the temporary nominal shock as in the model. Indeed, the second component is more
persistent than the movements in the long-short spread implied by the shock in the model. By attributing
all of the movements in the second component to the eﬀects of the temporary shock is overstating the shock’s
importance, thus maximizing the relative importance of the sticky price channel.
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nominal debt and heterogeneity than some parts of the literature on the debt channel, in
exchange the paper brings to the literature explicit treatment of FRM and ARM. Modeling
both FRM and ARM as long-term loans is critical when studying the real eﬀects of monetary
policy working through mortgage debt. Approximating ARM loans with one-period bonds,
as is often done in the macro literature, misses the nominal rigidity built into these contracts
and thus its interaction with the nominal interest rate and inﬂation. This point is especially
relevant as most countries have mortgage markets that are closer to ARM than FRM.
The literature on nominal debt and monetary policy eﬀectively started with the work
of Doepke and Schneider (2006a). Their study provides a comprehensive accounting exer-
cise of net nominal positions (nominal assets less nominal liabilities) of diﬀerent sectors
and types of households in the United States. It then demonstrates how the distribu-
tion of wealth, in present value real terms, is aﬀected by a surprise increase in inﬂation.
Building on a theoretical framework of Doepke and Schneider (2006b), the subsequent stud-
ies by Doepke and Schneider (2006c) and Doepke et al. (2015) feed these present value
changes in wealth into a heterogenous agent model to study their implications for house-
hold decisions and the economy. Accounting exercises have been also conducted for Canada
(Meh and Terajima, 2011) and the Euro Area (Adam and Zhu, 2016).7 Meh et al. (2010)
and Sheedy (2014) evaluate alternative monetary policy rules (inﬂation, price level, nomi-
nal GDP targeting) in the presence of nominal debt contracts. Sterk and Tenreyro (2016)
build a model in which nominal debt plays a key role in the implementation of monetary
policy through open market operations.8 Gomes, Jermann and Schmid (2013) focus on how
monetary policy and nominal corporate debt aﬀect ﬁrms’ decisions. Krause and Moyen
(forthcoming) and Hedlund (2016) study the consequences of inﬂating away nominal debt
burden of government and FRM debt respectively.9
7A more general exploration of redistributive eﬀects of monetary policy, beyond focusing on the nom-
inal debt channel, is conducted by Coibion, Gorodnichenko, Kueng and Silvia (2012) on the basis of VAR
analysis. In line with our results, they ﬁnd that persistent monetary policy shocks have larger eﬀects on
redistribution than do standard monetary policy shocks.
8The role of nominal debt in the conduct of monetary policy has been also explored at the zero lower
bound (e.g., Azariadis, Bullard, Singh and Suda, 2015; Braun and Oda, 2010).
9The question of deﬂating government debt is also studied by Hilscher, Raviv and Reis (2014).
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays down the model. Section 3 explains
the channels of transmission. Section 4 describes calibration. Section 5 reports quantitative
ﬁndings. Section 6 concludes. A supplementary material contains two appendixes containing
some auxiliary derivations.
2 The model
The economy’s population is split into two groups, ‘homeowners’ and ‘capital owners’, with
measures Ψ and (1−Ψ), respectively. Within each group, agents are identical. Homeowners
own the economy’s housing stock whereas capital owners own the economy’s capital stock.
Both agent types supply labor. This abstraction is motivated by cross-sectional observations
by Campbell and Cocco (2003): The typical homeowner is a middle class household in the
wealth distribution, with one major asset, a house, and almost no corporate equity. This is
in contrast to households in the top quintile of the wealth distribution, who own the entire
corporate equity in the economy and housing makes up a small fraction of their assets.10
Homeowners ﬁnance housing investment through mortgages with a given loan-to-value
ratio. Mortgages are modeled as long-term loans specifying the nominal payments that
homeowners have to make throughout the life of the loan (the model abstracts from de-
fault). By being long-term loans for house purchase, mortgages in the model resemble ﬁrst
mortgages, as opposed to home equity lines of credit, which are closer to the short-term loans
in Iacoviello (2005). The model economy operates under either ARM contracts (like, e.g.,
Australia) or FRM contracts (like, e.g., Germany). Our focus is on modeling the key char-
acteristics of these two basic mortgage contracts, rather than speciﬁc institutional details.11
10The lowest two quintiles in the data are renters with little assets and little debt. These agents are not
included in the model.
11Garriga et al. (2016) consider a richer mortgage market structure, allowing for reﬁnancing and mortgage
choice between FRM and ARM contracts. But when they calibrate their model to the data, these additional
features turn out not to aﬀect the responses of the model economy to shocks in a substantial way. This is due
to the fact that, even though the composition of new loans is sensitive to economic shocks, this translates
to only small changes in the composition of the outstanding stock of debt, either in terms of ARM vs. FRM
or reﬁnanced loans. And it is the composition of the stock that predominantly matters for the behavior of
the economy.
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Capital owners are the mortgage investors in the model and price mortgages competitively by
arbitrage. Financial markets are incomplete in the sense that the full set of state-contingent
securities does not exist. The only other ﬁnancial instrument available, apart from the
mortgage, that the two agent types can trade is a noncontingent one-period bond. Due to
the market incompleteness, the stochastic discount factors of the two agent types are not
equalized state by state and risk sharing is limited.
The production side of the economy has standard New-Keynesian features. In fact, the
model collapses into a standard representative agent New-Keynesian model with endogenous
capital once homeowners (and thus also housing and mortgage markets) are removed. Mo-
nopolistic intermediate good producers combine capital and labor according to a common
constant returns to scale (CRS) production function to produce goods that are used as in-
puts by perfectly competitive CRS ﬁnal good producers. The intermediate good producers
set prices in nominal terms, subject to price adjustment costs. Output of the ﬁnal good
can be used for consumption, investment in capital, and investment in housing, subject to
a concave production possibilities frontier (PPF). The concavity of the PPF plays a similar
role as investment adjustment costs used in New-Keynesian models. Monetary policy follows
an interest rate feedback rule. Finally, taxes, transfers, and government expenditures are
introduced into the model to ensure a sensible calibration, as explained in Section 4.
2.1 Capital owners
A representative capital owner (agent 1) maximizes expected life-time utility
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(c1t, n1t), β ∈ (0, 1),
7
where u(., .) has the standard properties guaranteeing a unique interior solution, subject to
a sequence of constraints
c1t+qKtxKt+
b1,t+1
pt
+
l1t
pt
= [(1− τK)rt + τKδK ] kt+(1−τN )wwtn1t+(1+it−1)b1t
pt
+
m1t
pt
+τ1t+Πt,
(1)
kt+1 = (1− δK)kt + xKt.
Here, c1t is consumption, n1t is labor, xKt is investment in capital, qKt is a relative price,
b1,t+1 is holdings of the one-period nominal bond between periods t and t + 1, pt is the
nominal price of the ﬁnal good, l1t is nominal mortgage lending, τK is a capital income tax
rate, rt is a real capital rental rate, δK is a capital depreciation rate, kt is capital, τN is a
labor income tax rate, w is the relative productivity of capital owners (a parameter), wt is
the aggregate real wage rate, it−1 is the nominal interest rate on the one-period bond bought
in the previous period, m1t is nominal payments from a pool of outstanding mortgages, τ1t
is government transfers, and Πt is proﬁts of the intermediate good producers, assumed to
be owned by the capital owner. The determination of mortgage payments is discussed in
Section 2.3.
2.2 Homeowners
A representative homeowner (agent 2) maximizes expected life-time utility
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtv(c2t, ht, n2t),
where v(., ., .) also has the standard properties, subject to a sequence of constraints
c2t + qHtxHt +
b2,t+1
pt
= (1− τN )wtn2t + (1 + it−1 +Υt−1)b2t
pt
+
l2t
pt
− m2t
pt
+ τ2t, (2)
l2t
pt
= θqHtxHt,
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ht+1 = (1− δH)ht + xHt.
Here, c2t is consumption, ht is housing stock, n2t is labor, xHt is housing investment, qHt is its
relative price, b2,t+1 is holdings of the one-period nominal bond between periods t and t+1,
l2t is new nominal mortgage borrowing, m2t is nominal mortgage payments on outstanding
debt, τ2t is government transfers, θ is a loan-to-value ratio, and δH is a housing depreciation
rate. Further, Υt−1 is the homeowner’s cost of participating in the bond market, taking
the form of a spread over the market interest rate it−1. The cost is governed by a function
Υ(−b˜2t), where b˜2t ≡ b2t/pt−1. The function Υ(.) is assumed to be increasing and convex and
satisfy the following additional properties: Υ(.) = 0 when b˜2t = 0, Υ(.) > 0 when b˜2t < 0
(the homeowner is borrowing), and Υ(.) < 0 when b˜2t > 0 (the homeowner is saving). We
think of Υ(.) > 0 as capturing a premium for unsecured consumer credit, which is increasing
in the amount borrowed. Υ(.) < 0 can be interpreted as intermediation costs that reduce
the homeowner’s returns on savings below those of capital owners. The bond market cost
function controls the extent to which the homeowner can use the bond market to smooth
out ﬂuctuations in income.12
2.3 Mortgages
Mortgages are modeled using the approximation of Kydland, Rupert and Sˇustek (forthcoming).
Mortgage loans—like the agents—live forever, but their payment schedules resemble those
of standard 30-year mortgages. Denoting by d1t the period-t stock of outstanding nominal
mortgage debt owed to the capital owner, the nominal mortgage payments received by the
capital owner in period t are
m1t = (R1t + γ1t)d1t.
12A technical role of the cost function is that, as in two-country business cycle models with incomplete
asset markets, it prevents the one-period debt from becoming a random walk in a log-linear solution of the
model. In other words, it keeps the log-linearized model stationary. In order to avoid the cost aﬀecting the
deﬁnition of aggregate output, it is rebated to the homeowner in a lump-sum way as a part of τ2t.
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Here, R1t and γ1t are, respectively, the interest and amortization rates of the outstanding
stock of debt. The variables comprising m1t are state variables evolving as
d1,t+1 = (1− γ1t)d1t + l1t, (3)
γ1,t+1 = (1− φ1t) (γ1t)α + φ1tκ, (4)
R1,t+1 =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ (1− φ1t)R1t + φ1ti
F
t , if FRM,
it, if ARM,
(5)
where iFt is the interest rate on new FRM loans and
φ1t ≡ l1t
d1,t+1
is the fraction of new loans in the outstanding mortgage debt next period. The amortization
rate γ1,t+1 and (in the FRM case) the interest rate R1,t+1 thus evolve as weighted averages
of the amortization and interest rates, respectively, of the existing stock and new loans. In
equation (4), κ, α ∈ (0, 1) are parameters. Speciﬁcally, κ is the initial amortization rate of a
new loan and α controls the evolution of the amortization rate over time.13
In the FRM case, a ﬁrst-order condition for l1t pins down an arbitrage-free i
F
t . Under such
a mortgage interest rate, the capital owner is indiﬀerent between extending new mortgage
loans and rolling over the one-period bond from period t on. Under ARM, the nominal
interest rate of the one-period bond, it, is an arbitrage-free mortgage rate in the above sense.
These properties are discussed further in Section 3. Under both contracts, as a result of the
arbitrage free pricing, the capital owner is indiﬀerent across investing in mortgages, bonds,
13Even though each new loan has an inﬁnite life, it shares under an appropriate choice of κ and α the
following features with standard mortgages. It gets essentially repayed within 30 years (120 periods, if the
model is quarterly). The nominal mortgage payments are approximately constant for most of these 30 years
(provided the loan’s interest rate does not change). And at the start of the life of the loan most of the
mortgage payments consist of interest payments, whereas towards the end of its life most of the payments
consist of amortization payments. See Kydland et al. (forthcoming) for details. The adopted modeling of
mortgages is convenient, as both the agents and the loans have an inﬁnite life, thus allowing a simple recursive
representation of the model with only a few state variables.
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and capital—in real terms, the present value of future cash ﬂows from one unit of any of
these assets is equal to one unit of current consumption. The capital owner’s composition of
period-t investment (in terms of xKt, b1,t+1, and l1t) is pinned down by homeowners’ demand
for new mortgages and the one-period bond.
The evolution of mortgage payments that the homeowner has to make is governed by
similar laws of motion as in the case of the capital owner:
m2t = (R2t + γ2t)d2t,
where
d2,t+1 = (1− γ2t)d2t + l2t, (6)
γ2,t+1 = (1− φ2t) (γ2t)α + φ2tκ, (7)
R2,t+1 =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ (1− φ2t)R2t + φ2ti
F
t , if FRM,
it, if ARM,
(8)
with φ2t ≡ l2t/d2,t+1. Demand for new mortgages is determined by the homeowner’s choice
of xHt and the ﬁnancing constraint l2t = θptqHtxHt.
2.4 Production
Perfectly competitive ﬁnal good producers, of which there is a measure one, produce a single
good Yt using as inputs a continuum of goods yt(j), j ∈ [0, 1]. The representative producer
solves a static proﬁt maximization problem
max
Yt,{yt(j)}10
ptYt −
∫ 1
0
pt(j)yt(j)dj subject to Yt =
[∫ 1
0
yt(j)
εdj
]1/ε
,
where pt(j) is the nominal price of an intermediate good j and ε ∈ (0, 1]. As all ﬁnal good
producers are the same, and there is a measure one of them, Yt is also aggregate output. A
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ﬁrst-order condition of this problem gives a demand function for good j
yt(j) =
[
pt
pt(j)
] 1
1−ε
Yt. (9)
The producer of the intermediate good j is a monopolist in market j. It faces the Calvo-
style price stickiness and, if allowed to change its price in period t, solves the dynamic
maximization problem
max
pt(j)
Et
∞∑
ι=0
ψιQ1,t+ι
[
pt(j)
pt+ι
yt+ι(j)− χt+ιyt+ι(j)
]
, j ∈ [0, 1], (10)
where Q1,t+ι ≡ βuc,t+ι/uct is the stochastic discount factor of the capital owner, χt+ι is a real
marginal cost, and yt+ι(j) is given by the demand function (9), with pt+ι(j) = pt(j) ∀ι.14
The expression in the square brackets is the per-period proﬁt and ψ ∈ [0, 1] is the probability
that the producer will not be able to change its price in a given period. By the law of large
numbers, it is equal to the fraction of producers not changing prices.
The real marginal cost χt is given by a linear cost function of a static cost minimization
problem
χtyt(j) = min
kt(j),nt(j)
rtkt(j) + wtnt(j) subject to Akt(j)
ςnt(j)
1−ς −Δ = yt(j).
Here, A is a constant technology level and kt(j) and nt(j) are capital and labor, respectively,
used by producer j.15 Further, Δ is a ﬁxed cost, which is a common feature of New-Keynesian
models with capital, ensuring that proﬁts in steady state are equal to zero. This is relevant
for mapping the parameter ς to National Income and Product Accounts. The ﬁrst-order
14Notation such as uct means the ﬁrst derivative of the function u with respect to argument c, evaluated
in period t.
15In this paper we focus only on the real eﬀects of nominal shocks, so TFP shocks or any other real shocks
are abstracted from. A is therefore just a parameter. In Garriga et al. (2016) we subject the model (a version
without the New-Keynesian features) to multiple shocks, including TFP shocks, and compare the model’s
business cycle properties with the data, as a form of model cross-validation.
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condition of the cost minimization problem is
wt
rt
=
(
1− ς
ς
)
kt(j)
nt(j)
, (11)
which sets relative factor prices equal to the marginal rate of technological substitution.
The cost function then yields χt ≡ A−1(rt/ς)ς [wt/(1 − ς)]1−ς . When this expression for the
marginal cost is combined with the above ﬁrst-order condition (11), we get
χt =
1
A(1− ς)
[
nt(j)
kt(j)
]ς
wt =
1
A(1− ς)
[
yt(j)
Akt(j)
] ς
1−ς
wt, (12)
where yt(j) ≡ yt(j) + Δ. The second equality follows by substituting in for nt(j) from the
production function. This expression will be relevant in Section 3.
The aggregate PPF is assumed to be nonlinear. Speciﬁcally,
Ct + qKtXKt + qHtXHt +G = Yt, (13)
where Ct ≡ (1−Ψ)c1t+Ψc2t, XKt ≡ (1−Ψ)xKt, XHt ≡ ΨxHt, andG is (constant) government
expenditures. Further, qKt is the marginal rate of transformation between consumption and
capital investment and qHt is the marginal rate of transformation between consumption and
housing investment (in steady state, the rates of transformation are normalized to be equal
to one). Under perfect competition, the rates of transformation are equal to relative prices
of capital and housing investment in terms of consumption, as has already been assumed in
the budget constraints. The rates of transformation are given by strictly increasing convex
functions q(XKt) and q(XH), which make the economy’s PPF concave. This speciﬁcation
is akin to that of Fisher (1997) and Huﬀman and Wynne (1999) and is meant to capture,
in a reduced-form way, the costs of moving factors of production across diﬀerent sectors
(e.g., between construction and nondurable goods). As noted above, the concavity of the
PPF works in a similar way as investment adjustment costs, which are a standard feature of
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New-Keynesian models with capital (the reason why will become apparent below).
2.5 Monetary policy
Monetary policy is modeled as an interest rate feedback rule with two shocks, μt and ηt,
it = i+ μt − π + νπ(πt − μt) + ηt, νπ > 1. (14)
Here, i and π are the steady-state short-term nominal interest and inﬂation rates, respec-
tively, πt ≡ pt/pt−1 − 1 is the inﬂation rate between periods t and t − 1, and νπ is a
weight on deviations of the inﬂation rate from a stochastic inﬂation target μt. The in-
ﬂation target has an unconditional mean equal to π and follows a stationary AR(1) process
μt+1 = (1− ρμ)π + ρμμt + ξμ,t+1, where ξμ,t+1 is a mean-zero innovation with standard devi-
ation σμ. The other shock has an unconditional mean equal to zero and follows a stationary
AR(1) process ηt+1 = ρηηt + ξη,t+1, where ξη,t+1 is a mean-zero innovation with standard
deviation ση. Both shocks are observed by the agents.
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Inﬂation target shocks have been considered by, e.g., Smets and Wouters (2003), Ireland
(2007), Atkeson and Kehoe (2009), and Krause and Moyen (forthcoming).17 Assuming the
inﬂation target shock is highly persistent, it plays a role of a ‘level factor shock’, shifting
short- and long-term nominal interest rates approximately equally, as discussed below. The
second shock is a ‘standard monetary policy shock’ studied in the New-Keynesian literature
(e.g., Gal´ı, 2015, among many others). In order to generate the typical New-Keynesian
responses, the persistence of this shock has to be fairly low. It thus essentially only aﬀects
the short rate and thus the long-short spread. Together, the two shocks allow the model to
be consistent with both, the New-Keynesian responses identiﬁed in VARs and the empirical
16The speciﬁcation of the policy rule abstracts from responding to ﬂuctuations in output and from interest
rate smoothing (a weight on past nominal interest rates). We have experimented with these features but
found them to have only a limited eﬀect on the results. In the interest of a more transparent exposition,
these features have therefore been dropped from the model.
17See Ireland (2007) for further discussion.
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persistence of the FRM rate.18
2.6 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the following conditions are satisﬁed: (i) the capital owner and the home-
owner solve their respective maximization problems, choosing contingency plans for c1t, n1t,
xKt, kt+1, b1,t+1, and l1t (capital owner) and for c2t, n2t, xHt, ht+1, b2,t+1, and l2t (homeowner);
(ii) intermediate good producers solve their respective optimization problems, choosing kt(j)
and nt(j) and, if allowed, pt(j); (iii) the relative prices qKt and qHt are given by the respective
marginal rates of transformation; (iv) monetary policy follows the interest rate rule; and (v)
mortgage, bond, labor, capital, and goods markets clear:
(1−Ψ)l1t = Ψl2t,
(1−Ψ)b1,t+1 +Ψb2,t+1 = 0,∫ 1
0
nt(j) = wN1t +N2t ≡ Nt,
∫ 1
0
kt(j) = Kt,
Ct + qKtXKt + qHtXHt +G = Yt.
In the above, N1t ≡ (1 − Ψ)n1t, N2t ≡ Ψn2t, and Kt ≡ (1 − Ψ)kt. As capital owners’
and homeowners’ labor inputs are perfect substitutes, capital owners’ wage rate is wwt,
whereas homeowners’ wage rate is wt, as has already been assumed in the respective budget
constraints. Aggregate consistency further implies: (1 − Ψ)d1t = Ψd2t, γ1t = γ2t, and
R1t = R2t. As a consequence, (1− Ψ)m1t = Ψm2t.19 For the quantitative experiments, the
18Through out the paper, we use the terms ’persistent shock’ and ’level factor shock’ and the terms
’temporary shock’ and ’standard monetary policy shock’ interchangeably.
19The government budget constraint is given by G+(1−Ψ)τ1t+Ψτ2 = τK(rt−δK)Kt+τNwt(wN1t+N2t).
It holds by Walras’ law. Here, τ2 is a parameter and τ1t takes up the slack to ensure that the budget
constraint is satisﬁed state-by-state. Transfers to the homeowner are given by τ2t = τ2 − (b2t/pt)Υt−1; i.e.,
the participation cost is rebated back to the homeowner in a lump-sum way in order not to aﬀect aggregate
output. In steady state, the participation cost is equal to zero.
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equilibrium is computed using standard log-linearization methods.
3 The channels of real eﬀects
Nominal rigidities in the model come from two sources: sticky prices and mortgage contracts.
In this section we discuss the equilibrium consequences of each rigidity in isolation in order
to facilitate the interpretation of the quantitative ﬁndings later on. First, however, it is
instructive to partially characterize the equilibrium mappings from the two shocks into the
nominal interest rate and inﬂation.
3.1 Nominal shocks, nominal interest rate, and inﬂation
Without the loss of generality, in the following discussion it is useful to abstract from the
capital income tax rate to simplify notation. The capital owner’s ﬁrst-order conditions for
b1,t+1 and xKt yield
1 = Et
(
Q1,t+1
1 + it
1 + πt+1
)
and 1 = Et
[
Q1,t+1
(
rt+1
qKt
+
qK,t+1(1− δK)
qKt
)]
. (15)
In the second equation, the ﬁrst term in the inner brackets can be interpreted as a dividend
yield, while the second term as a capital gain. Once log-linearized around a steady state,
the two equations yield the Fisher equation
it −Etπt+1 ≈ Et [rt+1 + (1− δK)qK,t+1 − qKt] ≡ r∗t , (16)
where r∗t is the ex-ante real interest rate and (abusing notation) all variables are in percentage
point deviations from steady state. Combining equation (16) with the policy rule (14),
assuming ρμ close to one and excluding explosive paths for inﬂation, yields
it ≈
∞∑
ι=0
(
1
νπ
)ι
Etr
∗
t+ι −
ρη
νπ − ρη ηt + μt. (17)
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Observe that unless the eﬀect of μt is suﬃciently oﬀset by an endogenous response of the
future path of the real rate, the μt shock generates almost permanent one-for-one changes
in it. It thus aﬀects not only the short rate but also the long rate (i
F
t ) and, in this sense,
works like a level factor shock. Substituting equation (17) into the policy rule (14) provides
an analogous expression for the inﬂation rate
πt ≈ 1
νπ
∞∑
ι=0
(
1
νπ
)ι
Etr
∗
t+ι −
1
νπ − ρη ηt + μt, (18)
where the eﬀect of μt is the same as on the nominal interest rate.
From equations (17) and (18) follows that the eﬀect of the standard monetary policy shock
ηt on both the short-term nominal interest rate and inﬂation is, ceteris paribus, negative. In
order to generate the typical New-Keynesian response of the two variables to a positive ηt
shock—i.e., a decline in πt but an increase in it—the ex-ante real rate has to increase: observe
that the real rate has a larger positive eﬀect on the nominal interest rate than on inﬂation,
whereas ηt has a larger direct negative eﬀect on inﬂation than on the nominal interest rate.
Observe further that the negative eﬀect of the shock increases with its persistence. Thus,
in order to produce an increase in the nominal interest rate alongside a decline in inﬂation,
the persistence of the shock cannot be too high. Otherwise, the direct negative eﬀect of
the shock on the nominal interest rate may outweight any positive eﬀect coming from an
increase in the real rate.
3.2 Sticky price channel
As noted above, if homeowners are removed (Ψ = 0), the model collapses into a standard
representative agent New-Keynesian model with endogenous capital. If homeowners are
present but mortgages are removed (θ = 0), the model becomes a two-agent New-Keynesian
model with endogenous capital and housing, in which housing investment is equity ﬁnanced.
All aspects of the model related to price stickiness are contained in the optimization problem
(10). As demonstrated in numerous texts (e.g., Gal´ı, 2015), the log-linearized version of the
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ﬁrst-order condition for this problem, once aggregation is imposed, yields the New-Keynesian
Phillips curve (NKPC)
πt =
(1− ψ)(1− βψ)
ψ
Θχ̂t + βEtπt+1, (19)
where Θ ≡ (1− ς)/[1− ς + ς/(1− ε)] ≥ 0 and χ̂t is the percentage deviation of the marginal
cost from steady state.20 This equilibrium condition embodies the nominal rigidity in the
model due to sticky prices. For β close to one, it provides a negative relationship between
an expected change in the inﬂation rate, Etπt+1 − πt, and the real marginal cost, χ̂t. For a
highly persistent inﬂation rate, Etπt+1 − πt is close to zero, implying χ̂t ≈ 0. In this case,
monetary policy has almost no real eﬀects. If, in contrast, the inﬂation rate is not very
persistent, then Etπt+1 − πt = 0 and χ̂t = 0. In this case, monetary policy has real eﬀects.
Appendix A.1 establishes that percentage deviations of the marginal cost are positively
related to percentage deviations of aggregate output, Ŷt.
21 Equation (19) thus provides a
negative relationship between Etπt+1 − πt and Ŷt. As a result, a shock that temporarily
reduces inﬂation, thus generating Etπt+1 − πt > 0, produces a decline in output, Ŷt < 0.
In the face of the output drop, consumption smoothing by capital owners requires a drop
in capital investment, which leads to a decline in qKt and thus positive expected capital
gains, Et(1− δK)qK,t+1 − qt > 0.22 A suﬃciently large increase in capital gains then leads to
an increase in the ex-ante real interest rate r∗t , as follows from equation (16). The greater
is the curvature of the PPF, the less can consumption be smoothed out in equilibrium.
Therefore, the greater is the increase in expected capital gains, and thus in the ex-ante real
interest rate. This mechanism generates the typical New-Keynesian response to a temporary
20Equation (19) is derived under the common assumption that the steady-state inﬂation rate is equal to
zero. This assumption provides a more elegant expression for the linearized NKPC than would otherwise
be the case. For expositional purposes, this section therefore proceeds under this common assumption, even
though the model is computed under a calibrated non-zero steady-state inﬂation rate.
21A positive relationship between χ̂t and Ŷt is easier to derive in the textbook New-Keynesian model
without capital, in which Ĉt = Ŷt.
22A drop in capital investment can occur through a direct channel, by capital owners reducing capital
investment for given holdings of bonds, and through an indirect channel, by homeowners reducing holdings
of the bonds, whose proceeds could otherwise be used to support capital investment by capital owners.
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monetary policy shock; i.e., the ex-ante real rate increases while output and inﬂation fall,
with a suﬃciently large increase in the real rate producing also an increase in the nominal
rate, as discussed above. As this is an aggregate eﬀect (i.e., aggregate output falls), the
decline in output is born by both agent types, albeit to a possibly diﬀerent extent.23
3.3 Mortgage channel
To highlight the role of mortgages, nominal prices in this section are assumed to be fully
ﬂexible (i.e., ψ = 0). The NKPC (19) then implies χ̂t = 0 (i.e., χt = χ). That is, the
marginal cost is constant, equal to its steady-state value, which is given by a standard static
proﬁt maximization condition of a monopolist, (1/ε)χ = p(j)/p; i.e., the relative price of
good j is set as a constant markup over marginal costs. When ε = 1, this condition yields
χ = 1. The marginal cost is equal to the relative price of good j, which is equal to one, as
all goods are perfectly substitutable; a standard proﬁt maximization condition under perfect
competition. As there are no monopoly proﬁts, we set Δ = 0. Equation (12), with χt = 1,
then yields wt = (1 − ς)AKςtN−ςt . Combining this expression with the cost minimization
condition (11) gives rt = ςAK
ς−1
t N
1−ς
t . Thus, under perfect competition, the wage rate and
the rental rate are equalized with the respective marginal products of labor and capital.
Mortgages introduce a nominal rigidity into the model due to the multi-period term over
which homeowners make nominal payments. The nominal rigidity shows up in two places:
as an income eﬀect in the budget constraints of the two agents and as a price eﬀect in a
ﬁrst-order condition of the homeowner for housing. The income eﬀect occurs due to the
eﬀects of inﬂation surprises on the real value of payments on outstanding mortgage debt,
while the price eﬀect concerns the eﬀects of expected future inﬂation on the cost of new
mortgage borrowing.24
23Again, these responses are easier to establish in the textbook New-Keynesian model without capital.
24Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Mishkin (2007) refer to the income eﬀect also as a ‘cash ﬂow’ or
‘household balance sheet’ eﬀect.
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3.3.1 Income eﬀect
It is convenient for this and the next section to write the real mortgage payments in the
budget constraints (1) and (2) as
met
pt
≡ m˜et = Ret + γet
1 + πt
d˜et (20)
where d˜et ≡ det/pt−1 and e ∈ {1, 2}. Recall that in period t, the variables Ret, γet, and
det that make up the nominal payments are pre-determined and from period t on evolve
according to the laws of motion (3)-(5), for e = 1, and (6)-(8), for e = 2. To focus on
outstanding debt, let us set le,t+ι = 0, for ι = 0, 1, 2, . . .
It is clear from equation (20) that, as the numerator is predetermined in period t, an
unexpected increase in πt has a standard income eﬀect under both FRM and ARM. It reduces
the real value of mortgage payments in period t and thus redistributes income from capital
owners to homeowners.
Suppose, however, that the increase in the inﬂation rate is persistent and assume there
are no further inﬂation surprises. From period t + 1 on, the eﬀects of higher inﬂation are
diﬀerent under FRM and ARM. Under FRM, the sequence of real mortgage payments is
m˜e,t+1 =
Ret + γe,t+1
(1 + πt+1)(1 + πt)
(1− γet)d˜et,
m˜e,t+2 =
Ret + γe,t+2
(1 + πt+2)(1 + πt+1)(1 + πt)
(1− γe,t+1)(1− γet)d˜et, etc.,
where Ret is constant and γe,t+ι converges to one over time.
25 Higher inﬂation thus reduces
the real value of mortgage payments under FRM and, through accumulated inﬂation, the
size of this eﬀect increases over time.
25γe,t+ι converges to one because γet ∈ (0, 1) and α ∈ (0, 1); see the law of motion (4) or (7) for le,t+ι = 0,
ι = 0, 1, 2, . . ..
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Under ARM, the sequence of real mortgage payments is
m˜e,t+1 =
it + γe,t+1
(1 + πt+1)(1 + πt)
(1− γet)d˜et, (21)
m˜e,t+2 =
it+1 + γe,t+2
(1 + πt+2)(1 + πt+1)(1 + πt)
(1− γe,t+1)(1− γet)d˜et, etc.,
The diﬀerence, compared with FRM, is that the mortgage rate of the outstanding debt is
equal to the short-term nominal interest rate, which can change over time. To demonstrate
the consequence of this aspect of ARM loans, let us ﬁrst focus on m˜e,t+1. Holding the
ex-ante real rate constant, a higher πt+1 translates through the Fisher equation (16) into
equiproportionally higher it. As a result, and in contrast to the FRM case, m˜e,t+1 increases.
To see this, focus on the ratio in equation (21), which can be written as
it + γe,t+1
(1 + πt+1)(1 + πt)
≈ it + γe,t+1
1 + πt+1 + πt
≈ it + γe,t+1 ≈ r∗ + πt+1 + γe,t+1,
where the ﬁrst two approximations hold for suﬃciently small inﬂation rates and γe,t+1 suﬃ-
ciently smaller than one. Thus, in contrast to FRM, a higher πt+1 leads to a higher m˜e,t+1.
This front-end property reﬂects the fact that at the early stages in the life of a mortgage, a
bulk of the payments are interest payments. Over time, however, the eﬀects of accumulated
inﬂation get stronger. To see this back-end property of the loan, notice that for a suﬃciently
high ι, the ratio can be written as
it+ι + γe,t+ι
1 + πt+ι + . . . πt+1 + πt
≈ r
∗ + πt+ι + γe,t+ι
1 + πt+ι + . . . πt+1 + πt
≈ γe,t+ι
1 + πt+ι + . . . πt+1 + πt
,
where the last approximation is due to γt+ι → 1 and r∗ and πt+ι being assumed to be
relatively small. Observe that for γ = 1 (i.e., a one-period loan, a short cut often taken in
the literature to model ARM), neither the front-end nor the back-end property of ARM is
present and the only eﬀect of inﬂation is the standard income eﬀect on m˜et in equation (20).
To sum up the income eﬀect: After the initial period t, higher inﬂation reduces real
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mortgage payments under FRM, but increases real mortgage payments under ARM, at least
in the short run. While the reduction under FRM is gradual, the increase under ARM is
immediate. Over time, however, as the loan gets amortized and interest payments become
a small fraction of mortgage payments, the income eﬀect under ARM starts to resemble the
income eﬀect under FRM.
3.3.2 Price eﬀect
The price eﬀect concerns the cost of new mortgage borrowing and thus the eﬀective price of
housing investment. The ﬁrst-order condition for xHt takes the form
vctqHt(1 + τHt) = βEtVh,t+1, (22)
where Vh,t+1 is the derivative of the homeowner’s value function with respect to ht+1 in a
recursive formulation of the problem and τHt is a wedge, discussed below, summarizing the
eﬀect of mortgage ﬁnance on the optimal choice of xHt. Notice that the wedge aﬀects the
ﬁrst-order condition in a similar way as the relative price of new housing qHt, hence the term
‘price eﬀect’. To see how nominal interest rates and inﬂation aﬀect the real cost of a new
mortgage loan in isolation, it is instructive to consider a once-and-for-all housing investment
decision in period t, without any outstanding debt. That is, assume d2t = 0, xHt > 0, and
xH,t+ι = 0 for ι = 1, 2, . . .. In this case, the wedge is
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τHt ≡ θ
{
−1 + Et
[
Q2,t+1
iMt+1 + γ2,t+1
1 + πt+1
+Q2,t+2
(iMt+2 + γ2,t+2)(1− γ2,t+1)
(1 + πt+1)(1 + πt+2)
+ ...
]}
. (23)
Here, Q2,t+ι ≡ βvc,t+ι/vct is the stochastic discount factor of the homeowner and iMt+ι = iFt
under FRM and iMt+ι = it+ι−1 under ARM. Observe that the term inside the square brackets
is a present value of real mortgage payments from the homeowner’s perspective (i.e., the
payments are discounted with the homeowner’s stochastic discount factor).
26See Appendix for derivation.
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The FRM interest rate is determined by a ﬁrst-order condition of the capital owner with
respect to l1t, which takes the form
1 = Et
[
Q1,t+1
iFt + γ1,t+1
1 + πt+1
+Q1,t+2
(iFt + γ1,t+2)(1− γ1,t+1)
(1 + πt+1)(1 + πt+2)
+ ...
]
, (24)
where Q1,t+ι ≡ βuc,t+ι/uct. It is straightforward to also verify that the following holds in the
case of ARM
1 = Et
[
Q1,t+1
it + γ1,t+1
1 + πt+1
+Q1,t+2
(it+1 + γ1,t+2)(1− γ1,t+1)
(1 + πt+1)(1 + πt+2)
+ ...
]
. (25)
These two conditions state that, from the capital owner’s perspective, the present value
of real mortgage payments on a one dollar loan has to be equal to one dollar. These two
conditions are the mortgage counterparts to the no-arbitrage conditions for bonds and capital
(15).
Observe that if asset markets were complete (Q1,t+ι = Q2,t+ι) then the present value in
equation (23) would be equal to one and the wedge would be equal to zero. Under incomplete
markets, Q1,t+ι = Q2,t+ι and the wedge in general is not equal to zero and depends on nominal
variables. To see how the price eﬀect works, assume again that the real rate r∗ is constant
and that there is no uncertainty about future inﬂation (the case of perfect foresight is the
easiest case in which to explain, without the loss of generality, the price eﬀect).
It is convenient to start with the ARM case. Suppose πt+1 increases. Through the Fisher
eﬀect, this leads to an equiproportional increase in it. As a result, the real mortgage payment
in period t + 1 increases, since as in the case of the income eﬀect, the dominant eﬀect is
the interest rate eﬀect. The same argument applies for other periods t + ι if the inﬂation
rate increases persistently. However, as in the case of the income eﬀect, there is again an ι
such that the eﬀect of accumulated inﬂation starts to dominate the eﬀect of higher nominal
interest rates. But if this occurs in a suﬃciently distant future, so that those future payments
are suﬃciently discounted, the wedge increases, making housing investment more expensive.
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In the FRM case, the pricing equation (24) shows that, for a given sequence of Q1,t+ι, the
mortgage rate iFt depends positively on future inﬂation. Higher expected future inﬂation thus
increases iFt . Similar arguments as in the ARM case therefore apply, at least qualitatively,
and higher inﬂation makes new FRM loans more expensive to the homeowner. Thus, in
contrast to the income eﬀect, the price eﬀect works qualitatively in the same direction under
FRM and ARM.
3.3.3 Summary of the mortgage channel
To summarize the mortgage channel, it operates by aﬀecting the relative price of new housing
and the distribution of current and expected future disposable income. Unlike the sticky price
channel, it does not directly aﬀect producers. Under ARM, both the price and income eﬀects
hurt homeowners when inﬂation increases. Under FRM, the price eﬀect hurts homeowners
while the income eﬀect beneﬁts them. In contrast to the sticky price channel, the size of the
price and income eﬀects increases with inﬂation persistence.
4 Calibration
The calibration is based on U.S. targets, details of which can be found in Garriga et al.
(2016). The New-Keynesian parameters are the standard ones in the literature. The mech-
anism under investigation, however, is not speciﬁc to the U.S. economy and applies more
generally. The U.S. calibration simply provides an example of a reasonable parameterization
of the model. Most of the targets are based on data for the post-war period, until 2007,
and come from National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) and the Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF). One period in the model corresponds to one quarter.
4.1 Functional forms
The capital owner’s per-period utility function is u(c1, n1) = log c1 − [ω1/(1 + σ1)]n(1+σ1)1 ,
where ω1 > 0 and σ1 > −1. Such speciﬁcation is common in the New-Keynesian literature.
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The homeowner’s utility function is analogous, except that it also depends on housing:
u(c2, h, n2) =  log c2+(1−) log h−[ω2/(1+σ2)]n(1+σ2)2 , with ω2 > 0, σ2 > −1, and  ∈ (0, 1).
The production function AKςN1−ς is also standard. The function governing the curvature of
the production possibilities frontier is qH(XHt) = exp(ζH(XHt−XH)), where ζH > 0 and XH
is the steady-state ratio of housing investment to output (output is normalized to be equal
to one in steady state). Analogously, qK(XKt) = exp(ζK(XKt−XK)), where ζK > 0 and XK
is the steady-state ratio of capital investment to output. Finally, Υ(−B˜t) = exp(−ϑB˜t)− 1,
where ϑ > 0 and in steady-state B˜ = 0. All the functional forms satisfy the properties
assumed in the description of the model.
4.2 Parameter values
The parameter values are listed in Table 1, where they are organized into nine categories:
Ψ (population); β, σ1, σ2, ω1, ω2,  (preferences); ς, Δ, δK , δH , w, ζK , ζH (technology);
G, τN , τK , τ 2 (ﬁscal); ε, ψ (goods market); θ, κ, α (mortgage market); ϑ (bond market);
π, νπ (monetary policy); and ρμ, ρη, σμ, ση (stochastic processes). Most parameters can
be assigned values independently, without solving a system of steady-state equations. Six
parameters (ω1, ω2, , w, τK , τ 2) have to be obtained jointly from such steady-state relations.
And another six parameters (ζK , ζH , ρμ, ρη, σμ, ση) are assigned values on the basis of the
dynamic properties of the model; these last six parameters do not aﬀect the steady state
and thus the values of the other parameters.
4.2.1 Parameters calibrated independently
We start with a description of the parameters in the ﬁrst group. The population parameter Ψ
is set equal to 2/3. This corresponds to the notion that the typical homeowner comes from the
middle class, the 3rd and 4th quintiles of the wealth distribution, whereas the typical owner of
capital comes from the 5th quintile (Campbell and Cocco, 2003). The parameter controlling
the elasticity of labor supply is treated symmetrically across homeowners and capital owners.
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Guided by the New-Keynesian literature, σ1 = σ2 = 1. Regarding β, the Euler equation
for l1t constrains i
F to equal to i in steady state. The Euler equation for b1,t+1 then relates
i and π to β. Using iF = 0.0233 and π = 0.0113, implies β = 0.9883. The parameter ς
corresponds to the NIPA share of capital income in output and is set equal to 0.283. As in
the New-Keynesian literature, the ﬁxed cost is set so as to ensure zero steady-state proﬁts.
This requires Δ = 0.2048. The depreciation rates δK and δH are set equal to 0.02225 and
0.01021, respectively, to be consistent with the average ﬂow-stock ratios for capital and
housing, XK/K and XH/H . Based on NIPA, the appropriate counterpart to G makes up on
average 0.138 of output and the aggregate labor income tax rate τN is 0.235. The parameter
ε governing the goods elasticity of substitution and the Calvo parameter ψ (the fraction of
ﬁrms not adjusting prices) are set equal to 0.83 and 0.7, respectively—standard values in
the New-Keynesian literature.27 The loan-to-value (LTV) ratio θ is set equal to 0.6. This is
based on the long-run average of the cross-sectional mean LTV ratio for newly-built home
mortgages and the share of conventional mortgages in total new loans. The amortization
parameters κ and α are set equal to 0.00162 and 0.9946, respectively. These values provide
a reasonable approximation of the payment schedule for a 30-year mortgage. The bond
market parameter ϑ is set equal to 0.035, in order to replicate an interest premium schedule
for unsecured credit estimated by Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima and Rios-Rull (2007). The
steady-state inﬂation rate π is set equal to the aforementioned average of 0.0113. The weight
on inﬂation νπ in the monetary policy rule is set equal to 1.5, a standard value in the New-
Keynesian literature.
4.2.2 Parameters calibrated jointly
Given the values of the parameters in the ﬁrst set, the values of the six parameters in the
second set (ω1, ω2, , w, τK , τ 2) are determined by matching, in steady state, six targets: the
observed average capital-to-output ratio (K = 7.06); housing stock-to-output ratio (H =
27According to this parameterization, the average price duration is (1 − ψ)−1 = 3.33 quarters, about 10
months.
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5.28); the aggregate hours worked (N = 0.255); capital owners’ income share from labor
(wwn1/income1 = 0.53), mortgage debt servicing costs of homeowners (m˜2/income2 =
0.15); and homeowners’ income share from transfers (τ2/income2 = 0.12). Here, income1 =
(rk + m˜1) + wwn1 + τ1, income2 = wn2 + τ 2, and m˜1 ≡ m1/p, m˜2 ≡ m2/p, with p
normalized in steady state to equal to one. The expressions for income are consistent with
the way income is deﬁned in SCF. These targets yield ω1 = 8.1616, ω2 = 13.004,  = 0.6183,
w = 2.4, τK = 0.3362, and τ 2 = 0.0589. Roughly speaking, K identiﬁes τK , H identiﬁes ,
homeowners’ income share from transfers identiﬁes τ 2, and the aggregate labor N , capital
owners’ income share from labor, and mortgage debt servicing costs of homeowners identify
the labor supply variables ω1, w, and ω2.
4.2.3 Discussion: the role of ﬁscal parameters
It is appropriate at this stage to explain why taxes and government expenditures are included
in the model. Without taxes on capital and labor, positive transfers to homeowners would
have to be ﬁnanced by negative transfers to capital owners, which is inconsistent with the
SCF data. Government expenditures in the model then ensure that, given the revenues from
capital and labor taxes, the transfers to the two agents are not too large and thus do not
account for too large shares of their income. Lining up the sources of income in the model
with the data allows for realistic margins of income adjustment in smoothing out the eﬀects
of the real value of mortgage payments on disposable income.
4.2.4 Calibration based on model dynamics
Six parameters remain to be assigned values: ζK , ζH, ρμ, ρη, σμ, ση. These are calibrated
on the basis of the model dynamics. Recall that we require the model to be consistent
with both, the standard New-Keynesian responses to a monetary policy shock, discussed in
Sections 3.1 and 3.2, and the empirical persistence of the FRM rate. The parameter ρμ is
chosen so as to replicate the latter.28 This yields ρμ = 0.99. The parameters ζK and ρη
2810-year government bond yield, rather than the 30-year FRM rate, is used due to longer data availability.
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are chosen so as to replicate the typical New-Keynesian responses. In particular, the model
is required to generate a one-percentage point (annualized) increase in the nominal interest
rate accompanied with a -0.5 percent decline in output. Such quantitative responses, based
on standard VARs, seem to roughly hold in both the United States and Eurozone data (e.g.,
Peersman and Smets, 2001). This strategy yields ζK = 4.5 and ρη = 0.3. The value of ρη
is within the bounds of the persistence of standard monetary policy shocks, from 0 to 0.5,
reported in the literature, depending on the model and the speciﬁcation of the interest rate
feedback rule.29 The parameter ζH is then chosen so as to make housing investment about
twice as volatile as capital investment, roughly in line with the data. This yields ζH = 5.0.
The calibration of σμ and ση is postponed until Section 5.2.
4.3 Steady-state implications
Table 2 reports the steady-state values of the model’s endogenous variables and, where
possible, the long-run averages of their data counterparts. The ﬁrst panel lists the variables
used as calibration targets, while the second panel lists implications of the parameterization
for other variables. As can be seen from the second panel, despite the stylized nature of
the model, the steady state is broadly consistent with a number of moments not targeted in
calibration. In particular, the model is consistent with the net rate of return on capital, the
share of asset income in total income of capital owners, the share of labor income in total
income of homeowners, and the distribution of earnings. Income distribution in the model
prescribes somewhat larger share to capital owners than in the data. We also calculate
mortgage payments, received (capital owner) or paid (homeowner), as a fraction of the
agents’ post-tax income. This fraction is much higher for the homeowner, 0.19, than for the
capital owner, 0.07.
29The model is not rich enough to replicate the exact shape of the responses to the standard monetary
policy shock obtained from the VARs. The calibration target is simply the sign and the relative size of the
responses of the nominal interest rate and output. In the data, the decline in output is somewhat delayed,
whereas in the model it is immediate.
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5 Findings
The presentation of ﬁndings consists of two steps. First, we present the responses of the
model economy to a one-percentage point (annualized) increase in the short-term nominal
interest rate occurring due to either (i) the temporary or (ii) the persistent shock. In each
case the responses are decomposed into the individual contributions of sticky prices (i.e.,
mortgages are removed by setting θ = 0) and mortgages (i.e., prices are made fully ﬂexible
by setting ψ = 0). Second, we calibrate the relative sizes of the two shocks from yield curve
data and use this information to assess the relative importance of the two shocks and the
two frictions for the economy.
5.1 A one-percentage point increase in the short rate
The results of the ﬁrst set of experiments conﬁrm the arguments regarding the interaction
between the frictions and the persistence of the shocks, developed analytically in Section 3,
and their consequences for the aggregates and redistribution. These ﬁndings are presented
in Figures 1-4.
Figure 1 shows the responses to the temporary shock under ARM. Under the baseline
scenario with both sticky prices and mortgages, we can see the typical New-Keynesian re-
sponses that the model was calibrated to generate: the nominal interest rate increases while
output and inﬂation fall, with the decline in output being larger than the decline in inﬂa-
tion. The decline in output is distributed across all of its components: consumption of both
homeowners and capital owners, housing investment, and capital investment all decline in
response to the shock. When the responses are decomposed into the eﬀects of the individual
frictions, it becomes apparent that they are driven by sticky prices. Mortgages are almost
irrelevant. Their presence essentially only leads to a short-lived increase in real mortgage
payments and thus somewhat stronger decline in consumption of homeowners than is the
case otherwise. Eﬀectively the same message comes out also from the responses under FRM,
as Figure 2 shows. Here, even the response of homeowners’ consumption is almost identical
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with or without mortgages, as the temporary shock under FRM has very limited eﬀect on
real mortgage payments.
Figures 3 and 4 report the responses, under ARM and FRM, to the level-factor shock.
First, observe that in both cases, by the nature of the shock, the nominal interest rate and
inﬂation increase almost one-for-one and that their responses are highly persistent. Further,
in line with our discussion in Section 3, real mortgage payments increase immediately and
persistently under ARM, whereas under FRM they exhibit a protracted decline. Notice also
that, in accordance with the intuition developed in Section 3, the size of the initial increase
in real mortgage payments under ARM is essentially the same (about 6%) as in the case of
the temporary shock. In both cases the nominal interest rate increases, on impact, by one
percentage point per annum. In the previous case this was due to an increase in the real
rate, whereas in the present case it is due to an increase in the inﬂation rate. In the present
case, however, the increase in real mortgage payments is substantially more persistent.
The two ﬁgures also show the redistributive nature of the shock. Under ARM, in response
to the sharp increase in real mortgage payments, consumption of homeowners declines. Hous-
ing investment, which is in addition negatively aﬀected by more expensive new loans (the
price eﬀect), also declines, thus reducing future housing services. In contrast, consumption
of capital owners, as well as capital investment, increase. Aggregate responses, measured by
the responses of aggregate output and consumption, are, however, small (as total investment
is the diﬀerence between output and total consumption, it also responds only a little). De-
composition into the contribution of the individual frictions shows that most of the responses
of consumption by the two agents (as well as of housing investment) are due to mortgages.
In fact, the redistributive consequences for homeowners would be even larger if sticky prices
were not present. This is because positive inﬂation under sticky prices somewhat increases
output and thus also homeowners’ income and consumption.
The message under FRM (Figure 4) is similar to that under ARM. The main eﬀect
of the level-factor shock is redistributive and redistribution occurs due to mortgages. The
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diﬀerence, compared with the ARM case, is that the redistribution is in favor of homeowners
and that the redistributive eﬀects are gradual, as expected from our discussion in Section 3.
5.2 Quantitative assessment
The movements in nominal interest rates in the model induced by the two shocks take the
form of either shifts in the level of all nominal interest rates or changes in the long-short
spread, iFt − it. We therefore bring in the principal component (PC) analysis of the nominal
yield curve in the data to gauge the relative sizes of the two shocks. The PC analysis reveals
that, like for the United States (e.g., Piazzesi, 2006), for a number of developed economies
two factors are suﬃcient to describe all of the movements of nominal interest rates across
maturities, including the short rate controlled by monetary policy. The quantitatively more
important factor closely resembles the persistent shock in the model.
5.2.1 Mapping the interest rate into principal components
Speciﬁcally, PC analysis decomposes ﬂuctuations in J yields into, at the most, J orthogonal
principal components.30 Let Yt be a vector of J nominal yields at time t and var(Yt) =
ΩΛΩ be its variance-covariance matrix, where Λ is a diagonal matrix of eigenvalues and Ω
is a matrix of the associated eigenvectors. A J × 1 vector of principal components is then
given as pct = Ω
−1(Yt − Y), where Y is the unconditional mean of the vector Yt. The
variance of the jth principal component is equal to the jth element of the matrix Λ and
tr(Λ) = tr(var(Yt)); i.e., the sum of the variances of the principal components is equal to
the sum of the variances of the individual yields.
We carry out the PC analysis for Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, and the United
States. These countries include both FRM and ARM countries. The sample is limited by our
requirement of data availability for at least three maturities of government bonds for each
30While the movements in the level of interest rates and the long-short spread in the model are not strictly
speaking orthogonal to each other, due to endogenous responses of the real rate in equation (17) to both
shocks, their correlation is essentially zero, as the persistent shock has only a tiny eﬀect on the real rate (it
moves nominal interest rates and inﬂation roughly by the same amount—refer back to Figures 3 and 4).
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country going back to at least mid 1970s. A selection of the yields for each country is plotted
in the left-hand side columns of Figures 5 and 6.31 Clearly, for all countries, the yields across
maturities tend to move together. This is reﬂected in the ﬁrst principal components plotted
in the right-hand side columns of Figures 5 and 6. The second principal component, also
plotted, accounts for the diﬀerences between the long and short yields.
Table 3 summarizes the statistical properties of the ﬁrst principal component. As would
be expected from the ﬁgures, the ﬁrst principal component is much more volatile than the
second principal component (measured by the ratio of their standard deviations) and ac-
counts for a bulk of the volatility across maturities. Over 95%, and in most countries 98%,
of the volatility is due to this factor; this percentage is for Λ1/ tr(Λ). The second principal
component essentially accounts for the remainder of the volatility; the other components
have negligible eﬀect. Furthermore, the ﬁrst principal component is highly persistent (auto-
correlation of around 0.98) and highly positively correlated with both short and long yields
(0.93-0.98 and 0.97-0.99, respectively). Its correlation with inﬂation is also high (0.67-0.80).32
All these properties are broadly in line with the properties of the level factor shock in the
model.
Let us rewrite equation (17) as
it ≈ μt +
[ ∞∑
ι=0
(
1
νπ
)ι
Etr
∗
t+ι −
ρη
νπ − ρη ηt
]
≡ μt + slopet. (26)
Recall that all variables are expressed as percentage point deviations from steady state.
Further,
var(it) ≈ var(μt) + var(slopet).
It is possible to decompose the variance of it this way as the μt shock has only a small eﬀect
31All data used in the PC analysis are from Haver: AUS (3M, 5YR, 10YR for 1972.Q1-2016.Q1); CAN
(3M, 1-3YR, 3-5YR, 5-10YR, 10+YR for 1962.Q1-2015.Q1); GER (3M, 1YR, 2YR, 3YR, 4YR, 5YR, 6YR,
7YR, 8YR, 9YR, 10YR for 1972.Q4-2012.Q1); JAP (3M, 3YR, 5YR, 7YR, 9YR for 1975.Q4-2014.Q4); and
US (3M, 1YR, 3YR, 5YR, 10YR, 20YR for 1953.Q2-2016.Q1). While the set of maturities and the sample
period diﬀer across countries, we chose to maximize the number of observations over sample consistency.
32The data for inﬂation are for quarterly year-on-year changes in CPI. Source: FRED.
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on the real rate rt+ι (it moves the nominal interest rate and inﬂation more or less by the
same amount; see Figures 3 and 4), thus making μt and slopet approximately orthogonal to
each other. From the PC analysis, the short rate is given as
ŷ1t = Ω11pc1t + Ω12pc2t + ot ≈ Ω11pc1t + Ω12pc2t, (27)
where ŷ1t = y1t − y1, Ω11 and Ω12 are factor loadings (elements of the matrix Ω), and ot
denotes the eﬀect of higher principal components.
As stated in the Introduction, we ask the hypothetical question: Suppose the observed
movements of nominal interest rates were due to only nominal (monetary policy) shocks.
What would be the quantitative importance of each friction, sticky prices and mortgage
contracts, in transmitting these shocks into real variables? Given the resemblance of the
level-factor shock in the model to the ﬁrst principal component in the data, we put equality
between the two. We then assign all of the remaining volatility in the short rate in the data
to the standard monetary policy shock. Equations (26) and (27) thus provide the following
mapping between the data and the model
Ω11pc1t = μt and Ω12pc2t = slopet.
Abstracting from other factors behind the movements in the second principal component,
such as time-varying risk premia, overstates the contribution of the standard monetary policy
shock to the movements in the short rate. As this shock transmits only through sticky
prices, this assumption maximizes the quantitative importance of the sticky price channel in
aﬀecting the real variables in the model.
Taking the U.S data as representative of the data in Figures 5 and 6, the variance of
the short rate is equal to 5.897e-5 (this is for the data at the quarterly rate; i.e., the annual
percentage rate divided by 400). Using the calibrated persistence of the two shocks, 0.99
for the level-factor shock and 0.3 for the temporary shock, the standard deviations of the
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respective innovations are chosen so that μt accounts for 95% and slopet for 5% of the
volatility of it, while matching the volatility of it in the data.
33 This yields, σμ = 0.0011 and
ση = 0.0025. Because the nominal interest rate responds to the two shocks very similarly
under both ARM and FRM (refer back to Figures 1-4), the same standard deviations (up
to the fourth decimal place) are obtained in the two cases.
5.2.2 Findings from simulations
Using the above values of σμ and ση, the model is simulated to obtain the stationary dis-
tribution of the endogenous variables under (i) both shocks, (ii) only the level factor shock,
and (iii) only the standard monetary policy shock. The purpose of these simulations is to
see the relative magnitude of the real eﬀects of the two shocks and hence the two frictions.
Recall that the level factor shock transmits mainly through mortgages, whereas the standard
monetary policy shock transmits only through sticky prices. The stationary distribution is
normal as the shocks are normally distributed and the approximate solution of the model
is linear. The mean of the stationary distribution is the deterministic steady state. We use
both standard deviations and variances to report the real eﬀects. Standard deviations are
easier to interpret, but variances allow for decomposition. Table 4 contains the ﬁndings. In
the simulations, like in the impulse responses, the interest rate is measured as percentage
point deviations from steady state, quantities as percentage deviations from steady state.
Aggregate and individual quantities are thus measured in the same unit. In contrast to the
impulse responses, the interest rate is APR/400.
The ﬁrst line of Table 4 simply reports that the level factor shock indeed accounts for
95% of the movements of the short rate. Next, observe that under both shocks, individual
consumption of the two types is more volatile than aggregate consumption under both ARM
and FRM (indeed, C1 and C2 are negatively correlated; see the bottom line of the table).
The standard deviations are similar under the two contracts.34 Once the volatility (i.e.,
33Our main results stay basically the same if we use instead the persistence of the ﬁrst principal component
in the data, equal to 0.98, instead of the calibrated value 0.99 we have worked with so far.
34These are unconditional moments and so the timing of the movements in consumption reported in the
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variance) of the consumption variables is decomposed into volatility due to each shock, the
level factor shock accounts for a bulk of the volatility of individual consumption of the two
agent types (80% and 83% of C1 and C2, respectively, under ARM and 82% and 93%, under
FRM), whereas the standard monetary policy shock accounts for a bulk of the volatility of
aggregate consumption (78% under ARM and 96% under FRM). The level factor shock is
thus the main driving force behind individual consumption volatility, whereas the standard
monetary policy shock is the main driving force behind aggregate consumption volatility.
The redistributive vs. aggregate consequences of the shocks are also demonstrated by the
correlations of C1 with C2. Under the level factor shock the correlations are -0.89 and -0.99
under ARM and FRM, respectively, whereas under the standard monetary policy shock the
correlations are 0.65 and 0.77.35
With respect to the relative sizes of the eﬀects of the two shocks on individual and
aggregate consumption, the amount of the volatility of C1 and C2 attributed to the level
factor shock is somewhat larger than the amount of the volatility of aggregate consumption
attributed to the standard monetary policy shock: the level factor shock generates variances
of, respectively, C1 and C2 equal to 1.69e-5 and 9.86e-5 under ARM and 1.97e-5 and 15.2e-5
under FRM, whereas the standard monetary policy shock generates variances of C equal to
0.6e-5 under both contracts. The redistributive consequences of the persistent shock to the
policy rate are thus at least as important as the aggregate consequences of the temporary
shock. Furthermore, as the variances show, these consequences are far more signiﬁcant for
the homeowner, than the capital owner.
For completeness, we also report the ﬁndings for the investment variables. The picture
here is less clear-cut, but at least for housing investment, most of the volatility is due
to the level factor shock (60% under ARM and 0.71% under FRM). Indeed, as the table
shows, including housing into the measure of consumption of the homeowner, as C	2tH
1−	
t ,
impulse responses are not of a ﬁrst order importance.
35An idealized shock with purely redistributive consequences for consumption should generate perfect
negative correlation and have no eﬀect on aggregate consumption, whereas an idealized shocks with purely
aggregate consequences for consumption should generate a perfect positive correlation.
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increases the share of homeowners’ individual consumption accounted for by this shock. As
for aggregate output, most of the volatility is due to the standard monetary policy shock
(60% under ARM and 76% under FRM), but the eﬀects of the level factor shock are not
negligible (40% under ARM and 24% under FRM).
6 Conclusion
The presence of nominal rigidities is an important element in the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy. For a number of developed economies, yield curve data show that
ﬂuctuations in nominal interest rates, including the short rate that is under an eﬀective
control of monetary policy, are well captured by two distinct components. One is relatively
temporary whereas the other is highly persistent. Such changes in the policy interest rate
can potentially generate both aggregate as well as redistributive eﬀects in the economy, in
particular when borrowers and lenders use long-term nominal contracts, such as mortgages,
and products markets are not fully ﬂexible.
Using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, we compare the quantitative im-
portance of such nominal rigidities, sticky prices and long-term mortgage contracts, in trans-
mitting temporary and persistent changes in the policy rate into the real economy. Sticky
prices have been at the core of models used for monetary policy analysis for nearly two
decades, while the interest in nominal debt contracts is more recent. Our model indicates
that the sticky price channel is the more important transmission mechanism for temporary
changes in the policy rate, whereas the mortgage channel is powerful when the changes are
persistent. The real eﬀects of the two channels, however, manifest themselves diﬀerently. The
rigidities in product markets generate signiﬁcant aggregate eﬀects but small redistributive
eﬀects. The opposite holds for the transmission through mortgages. Simulating the economy
shows that the redistributive consequences of monetary policy operating through the mort-
gage channel are of similar magnitudes as the standard aggregate consequences operating
through the sticky price channel. The size of the redistribution is not aﬀected by the nature
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of the debt contract (ARM vs. FRM), although the timing and direction is. Furthermore,
consumption of homeowners (borrowers) is aﬀected signiﬁcantly more than consumption of
lenders.
In terms of policy implications for central banks, the model suggests that while persistent
changes in the policy rate have a small impact on aggregate economic activity, they generate
sizeable redistributions in mortgage markets. This lesson is especially pertinent in the current
policy environment, in which nominal interest rates have been kept at low levels for almost a
decade. The purpose of such policies was to stimulate aggregate economic activity. According
to our model, the initial cut in policy rates may have fulﬁlled this objective, to the extent it
was expected to be temporary, but the subsequent policy of keeping rates low for a substantial
period of time more likely led to income and consumption redistribution than to the desired
aggregate eﬀects. As inﬂation followed nominal interest rates to similarly low levels, based on
our model, we can infer that lenders in FRM countries gained at the expense of borrowers due
to persistently low inﬂation rates, while in ARM countries borrowers gained at the expense
of lenders due to persistently low nominal interest rates.
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Table 1: Parameter values
Symbol Value Description
Population
Ψ 2/3 Share of homeowners
Preferences
β 0.9883 Discount factor
σ1 1.0 Frisch elasticity (capital owner)
σ2 1.0 Frisch elasticity (homeowner)
ω1 8.1616 Disutility from labor (capital owner)
ω2 13.004 Disutility from labor (homeowner)
 0.6183 Weight on consumption (homeowner)
Technology
ς 0.283 Capital share of output
Δ 0.2048 Fixed cost
δK 0.02225 Depreciation rate of capital
δH 0.01021 Depreciation rate of housing
w 2.4 Rel. productivity of cap. owners
ζK 4.5 Curvature of PPF (XK)
ζH 5.0 Curvature of PPF (XH)
Fiscal
G 0.138 Government expenditures
τN 0.235 Labor income tax rate
τK 0.3362 Capital income tax rate
τ2 0.0589 Transfer to homeowner
Goods market
ε 0.83 Elasticity of substitution
ψ 0.7 Fraction not adjusting prices
Mortgage market
θ 0.6 Loan-to-value ratio
κ 0.00162 Initial amortization rate
α 0.9946 Amortization adjustment factor
Bond market
ϑ 0.035 Participation cost function
Monetary policy
π 0.0113 Steady-state inﬂation rate
νπ 1.5 Weight on inﬂation
Exogenous processes
ρμ 0.99 Persistence of the level factor shock
ρη 0.3 Persistence of standard mon. pol. shock
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Table 2: Nonstochastic steady state vs long-run averages of U.S. data
Symbol Model Data Description
Targeted in calibration:
iM 0.0233 0.0233 Nominal mortgage rate
XK 0.156 0.156 Capital investment
XH 0.054 0.054 Housing investment
K 7.06 7.06 Capital stock
H 5.28 5.28 Housing stock
N 0.255 0.255 Aggregate hours worked
wwn1/income1 0.53 0.53
¶ Labor income in cap. owners’ income
m˜2/(wn2 + τ2) 0.15 0.15 Debt-servicing costs (pre-tax)
τ2/(wn2 + τ2) 0.12 0.12
¶ Transfers in homeowners’ income
Not targeted:
A. Capital owner’s variables
(1− τK)(r − δK) 0.012 0.013§ Net (post-tax) rate of return on capital
[(r − δ)k + m˜1]/income1 0.42 0.39¶,§§ Income from assets in total income
τ1/income1 0.05 0.08 Transfers in total income
m˜1/netincome1 0.07 N/A Mortg. income in post-tax income
B. Homeowner’s variables
wn2/(wn2 + τ2) 0.88 0.82
¶ Labor income in total income
τH 0 N/A Housing wedge
m˜2/[(1− τN )wn2 + τ2] 0.19 N/A Debt-servicing costs (post-tax)
C. Earnings distribution
wwN1/[wwN1 + wN2] 0.60 0.54
¶ Capital owners’ share
wN2/[wwN1 + wN2] 0.40 0.46
¶ Homeowners’ share
D. Income distribution
Income1/[Income1 + (wN2 +Ψτ2)] 0.70 0.60
¶ Capital owners’ share
(wN2 +Ψτ2)/[Income1 + (wN2 +Ψτ2)] 0.30 0.40
¶ Homeowners’ share
Notes. Y = 1 in steady state. Capital owner’s income: income1 = (rk + m˜1) + wwn1 + τ1;
Income1 = (1 − Ψ)income1; and netincome1 = ((1 − τK)rk + τKδKk + m˜1) + (1 − τN )wwn1 + τ1.
Rates of return, interest, and amortization rates are expressed at quarterly rates.
¶ SCF; the model counterpart is deﬁned so as to be consistent with the deﬁnition in SCF.
‡ Average for a standard 30-year mortgage.
§ NIPA-based estimate (Gomme, Ravikumar and Rupert, 2011).
§§ The sum of capital and business income in SCF, where capital income is income from all ﬁnancial
assets.
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Figure 1: ARM; responses to the standard monetary policy shock. Interest rates and the
inﬂation rate are measured as percentage point (annualized) deviations from steady state,
quantities are in percentage deviations. One period = one quarter.
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Figure 2: FRM; responses to the standard monetary policy shock. Interest rates and the
inﬂation rate are measured as percentage point (annualized) deviations from steady state,
quantities are in percentage deviations. One period = one quarter.
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Figure 3: ARM; responses to the level factor shock. Interest rates and the inﬂation rate
are measured as percentage point (annualized) deviations from steady state, quantities are in
percentage deviations. One period = one quarter.
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Figure 4: FRM; responses to the level factor shock. Interest rates and the inﬂation rate
are measured as percentage point (annualized) deviations from steady state, quantities are in
percentage deviations. One period = one quarter.
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Figure 5: Nominal interest rates and principal components. Note: Only selected maturities
used in the principal component analysis are plotted in the left-hand side charts (see the text
for a complete list of maturities used).
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Figure 6: Nominal interest rates and principal components (continued). Note: Only selected
maturities used in the principal component analysis are plotted in the left-hand side charts
(see the text for a complete list of maturities used).
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Table 3: Statistical properties of the 1st principal component (level factor)
std(1st pc)
std(2nd pc) % var(ylds) expl. acorr corr w/ short corr w/ long corr w/ inﬂ.
AUS 5.49 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.67
CAN 7.69 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.72
GER 5.02 0.96 0.98 0.93 0.97 0.80
JAP 7.92 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.77
US 6.22 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.73
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Table 4: Quantitative assessment of the shocks/frictions
ARM FRM
100 × std % var % var 100 × std % var % var
μ and η only μ only η μ and η only μ only η
i 0.77 0.95 0.05 0.77 0.95 0.05
C 0.32 0.22 0.78 0.25 0.04 0.96
C1 0.52 0.80 0.20 0.54 0.82 0.18
C2 1.21 0.83 0.17 1.33 0.93 0.07
C2,total 0.97 0.88 0.12 1.12 0.96 0.04
X 1.22 0.55 0.45 1.08 0.53 0.47
XK 0.66 0.72 0.28 0.43 0.39 0.61
XH 1.79 0.60 0.40 1.85 0.71 0.29
Y 0.45 0.40 0.60 0.37 0.24 0.76
corr corr corr corr corr corr
μ and η only μ only η μ and η only μ only η
C1, C2 -0.61 -0.89 0.65 -0.78 -0.99 0.77
Note. The moments are for the stationary distribution of the endoge-
nous variables. The μt (level factor) shock transmits mainly through
mortgages whereas the ηt (standard monetary policy) shock transmits
only through sticky prices. The interest rate (APR/400) is measured as
a percentage point deviation from steady state, quantities as percent-
age deviations from steady state. Agent 1 = capital owner, agent 2 =
homeowner. C2,total = C
	
2H
1−	.
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Supplementary material: Appendixes
A.1. Real marginal costs and aggregate output
Given that the NKPC in the text is based on a log-linear approximation, our exposition
uses log-linear approximations of the other relevant equations as well. First, a log-linear
aggregate counterpart to equation (12) is
χ̂t =
ς
1− ς
1
1 + Υ/Y
Ŷt + ŵt − ς
1− ς K̂t, (A.1)
where all variables are in percentage deviations from steady state.36 For a given ŵt and the
state variable K̂t, this equation provides a positive relationship between aggregate output
and the marginal cost. The wage rate can be eliminated from equation (A.1) by utilizing
ﬁrst-order conditions of the two agents for labor supply: uct(1 − τN)wwt + unt = 0 and
vct(1 − τN )wt + vnt = 0. At the aggregate level, in a log-linearized form, these conditions
become
Φ1nN̂1t = Φ1wŵt + Φ1cĈ1t and Φ2nN̂2t = Φ2wŵt + Φ2cĈ2t, (A.2)
where for standard utility functions (e.g., log additive) Φ1c < 0, Φ1w > 0, and Φ1n > 0, and
similarly for the second agent. Further, from the production function of intermediate goods
producers follows
(1 + Υ/Y )−1Ŷt = (1− ς)[υN̂1t + (1− υ)N̂2t] + ςK̂t, (A.3)
where υ ≡ wN1/N .37 For tractability, focus on immediate responses from steady state. This
allows us to set K̂t = 0. Furthermore, to simplify the exposition, assume that the agents can
smooth out consumption reasonably well so that changes in consumption are small, Ĉ1t ≈ 0
and Ĉ2t ≈ 0. The above equations, once χ̂t, ŵt, N̂1t and N̂2t are substituted out, then provide
a negative relationship between Etπt+1 − πt and Ŷt in the NKPC (19).
A.2. Derivation of the housing wedge
This appendix derives the expression for the housing wedge in the main text. The ﬁrst-order
condition for xHt is
vctqHt(1 + τHt) = βEtVh,t+1,
where
τHt = −θ
{
1 +
βEtV˜d,t+1
vct
+
ζDt(κ− γα2t)βEtVγ,t+1
vct
+
ζDt(i
M
t − R2t)βEtVR,t+1
vct
}
.
36Equation (A.1) contains the well-known result that an aggregation bias—occurring due to price disper-
sion across the intermediate good producers—disappears under log-linearization around a zero steady-state
inﬂation rate.
37Equation (A.3) also contains the result that the Calvo aggregation bias due to price dispersion disappears
under a log-linearization around zero steady-state inﬂation rate.
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Here, V˜d,t+1 ≡ ptVd,t+1, Vγ,t+1, and VR,t+1 are the derivatives of the value function with re-
spective to the variables in the subscript. Speciﬁcally, Vγ,t+1 and VR,t+1 capture the marginal
eﬀects of new loans on the amortization and interest rates of the outstanding stock of debt
next period, and thus on the life-time utility (notice that the latter eﬀect is absent under
ARM, as R2t = i
M
t ). The derivatives are given by Benveniste-Scheinkman conditions
V˜dt = −vct
(
R2t + γ2t
1 + πt
)
+β
(
1− γ2t
1 + πt
)
Et
[
V˜d,t+1 + ζxt(γ
α
2t − κ)Vγ,t+1 + ζxt(R2t − iMt )VR,t+1
]
,
Vγt = −vct
(
d˜2t
1 + πt
)
+
[
ζxt(κ− γα2t) +
(1− γ2t)αγα−12t
1−γ2t
1+πt
d˜2t + θqtxHt
](
d˜2t
1 + πt
)
βEtVγ,t+1
−
(
d˜2t
1 + πt
)
βEtV˜d,t+1 + ζxt(it − R2t)
(
d˜2t
1 + πt
)
βEtVR,t+1,
and
VRt = −v2t
(
d˜2t
1 + πt
)
+
1−γ2t
1+πt
d˜2t
1−γ2t
1+πt
d˜2t + θqtxHt
βEtVR,t+1.
Further, in terms of new notation
ζDt ≡
(
1− γ2t
1 + πt
d˜2t
)
/
(
1− γ2t
1 + πt
d˜2t + θqHtxHt
)2
and
ζxt ≡ θqHtxHt/
(
1− γ2t
1 + πt
d˜2t + θqHtxHt
)2
.
Observe that when d2t = 0 and xH,t+ι = 0 for ι = 1, 2, . . ., the above expressions, by forward
substitutions, yield the wedge in the main text
τHt ≡ θ
{
−1 + Et
[
Q2,t+1
iMt + γ2,t+1
1 + πt+1
+Q2,t+2
(iMt+1 + γ2,t+2)(1− γ2,t+1)
(1 + πt+1)(1 + πt+2)
+ ...
]}
.
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